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RESTITUTION OF DISTRIBUTIONS BY A
FIDUCIARY TO WHICH THE RECIPIENT
WAS NOT ENTITLED
By GEORGE E. PmER*
WHEN a fiduciary pays or distributes fiduciary funds or other
property to the wrong person, or distributes more than his due to
a person who has a valid claim, or distributes funds to a legatee or
heir (used herein to include next of kin) when the funds are needed
to pay debts, a complex of problems may arise.1 May the fiduciary
obtain restitution from the recipient of the benefit? Is restitution
available to the person who should have received the funds? Is
restitution in either case limited to payment by mistake, and if so
does it make a difference whether the mistake was of fact or law?
And finally, is the fiduciary personally liable to the one entitled to
the funds?2 This last issue should be irrelevant to the solution of
the restitution problems, but by some authority, mostly English, it
may become critical.
Some reference to early English decisions seems necessary, not
so much because of the influence of the decisions on case-law in
this country as because of the influence on discussion in American
texts and other writing.
L
Resiiution from an Actual or Supposed Heir, Legatee
or Beneficiary
Restitution may be sought from an actual or supposed heir, le-
gatee or beneficiary for a variety of reasons. The distribution may
have been made in the belief that the recipient was an heir when
in fact he was not. In such a case the property should have gone to
the true heirs and restitution may be sought either by them or by
the personal representative. Similar mistakes can occur in distribu-
tion under a will or a trust. Again, a legatee may have been paid
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1 The problems are discussed in Warren, Problems in Probate and Ad-
ministration, 32 HARv. L. REv. 315, 329-48 (1919).
2 In general, the fiduciary will be liable for an improper distribution,
unless it is pursuant to court order. The problem as it relates primarily to
trusts is discussed in Schuyler, Payments Under Void Trusts, 65 IARv. L. Rav.
597 (1952); Schuyler, The Fiduciary Must Know the Law, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
177 (1961).
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in full, leaving insufficient assets to pay other legacies of the same
class. In this instance restitution of only a portion of the distribution
is in order, and again it may be sought either by the personal repre-
sentative or by the underpaid legatees. Sometimes distribution is
made to heirs and legatees which leaves insufficient assets in the
estate to pay debts, with restitution sought either by an unpaid
creditor or by the personal representative.
Suit by Unpaid Creditor
Some of the earliest English cases, decided in the 17th century,
allowed restitution from an heir or legatee in favor of an unpaid
creditor.3 For modern law perhaps the most significant aspect of
these cases is that the order for refund was entered upon a showing
of insufficiency of assets left to pay creditor's claims. No attempt
was made to fit recovery into mistake doctrine, even though the
decisions began during the period in which assumpsit came into use
to recover money paid by mistake4 -mistake of performance, as it
might be called today.5 It was enough for the Chancellor in 1682
to say that "the common justice of this court will compel a legatee
to refund."8 Restitution at suit of the creditor was granted where
the executor's distribution was not the product in mistake, and where
the executor himself would not be entitled to restitution because he
paid with notice of the debt. This was decided in the 17th century7
and confirmed nearly 200 years later in Jervis v. Wolferstan,8 where
a contingent liability of the estate materialized after the executor
had made distribution to residuary legatees and restitution from the
legatees was granted in favor of the creditor.
The claim of an unpaid creditor, as well as the claim of an
unpaid or underpaid distributee or legatee, can be based on the
view that he has an equitable interest in the assets and that the
3 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 1 Ch. Cas. 256, 22 Eng. Rep. 788 (1675);
Noel v. Robinson, 1 Vern. 90, 23 Eng. Rep. 334 (Ch. 1682) (dictum); Anony-
mous, 1 Vern. 162, 23 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch. 1683); Hodges v. Waddington, 2
Vent. 360, 86 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1684); Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130,
38 Eng. Rep. 525 (Ch. 1827); March v. Russell, 3 My. & Cr. 31, 40 Eng. Rep.
836 (Ch. 1837); Noble v. Brett, 24 Beav. 599, 53 Eng. Rep. 450 (Rolls Ct. 1858);
Jervis v. Wolferstan, L.R. 18 Eq. 18 (1874).
4 Tompkins v. Bernet, 1 Salk. 22, 91 Eng. Rep. 22 (K.B. 1693); Comber-
bach Rep. 447, 90 Eng. Rep. 583 (K.B. 1698).
5 G. PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 21-32 (1962).
6 Noel v. Robinson, 1 Vern. 90, 94, 23 Eng. Rep. 334, 336 (Ch. 1682).
7 Hodges v. Waddington, 2 Vent. 360, 86 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1684).
8 L.R. 18 Eq. 18 (1874). The liability of the estate arose out of calls
against shareholders of an insurance company which became insolvent after
distribution of the estate. The action against the legatees, based upon the
decedent's liability as a shareholder, was brought by one who was also liable
on the call but was entitled to be indemnified out of the decedent's estate.
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defendant legatee or distributee took subject to this equitable interest.
An executor or administrator takes legal title to the decedent's per-
sonal property, but like a trustee he holds this title for the benefit of
others, in this case the creditors, heirs and legatees as their interests
may appear."
In American law the procedure for filing and allowing claims
against a decedent's estate reduces the likelihood that legatees or
distributees will be paid before creditors.10 When this does occur
it seems likely that, except in Pennsylvania, restitution will be given
in favor of an unpaid creditor who has properly presented his claim,
unless the distribution was the result of a mistake of law on the
part of the personal representative and the court is misled into be-
lieving that this somehow prevents restitution in favor of the person
ultimately entitled to the assets.1 The English cases granting resti-
tution to a creditor, without regard to the personal representative's
right to restitution, should demonstrate that the creditor's claim is
not grounded on mistake, hence the fact that there was mistake of
law should be regarded as legally irrelevant.
Suit by Unpaid or Underpaid Legatee or Beneficiary
Where one legatee sought restitution from another because the
latter had been paid in full before discovery that there were insuf-
ficient assets to pay all legacies of that class, the 17th century
English cases treated this as analogous to a creditor's claim. As with
the creditor, the unpaid or underpaid legatee was entitled to compel
a refund "where the assets become deficient."'12 Subsequently, how-
ever, there were occasional statements to the effect that recovery
would be denied if the deficiency of assets was the result of a
wasting of assets by the executor after payment of the defendant's
9 Thorsen v. Hooper, 57 Ore. 75, 109 P. 388 (1910).
10 The English decisions were under a practice substantially different
from that commonly followed today in this country. As described by Eldon in
Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130, 38 Eng. Rep. 525 (Ch. 1827), there appar-
ently was no time limit on the filing of claims. In an account of debts a decree
could be entered for payment of those proved and this protected the personal
representative in making distribution. But a creditor could later prove his
claim, which meant that if the assets had been distributed the claim could be
satisfied only through obtaining restitution from the legatees or distributees.
In that case the court said the creditor could compel restitution, and that the
burden of doing so was on him rather than the personal representative. Ac-
cord, Harrison v. Kirk, [1904] A.C. 1 (P.C.); cf. N.Y. Suiaa CT. PRoc. § 1802
(McKinney 1967).
11 Creditors' claims may be affected by legislation. Thus, in Massachu-
setts a creditor may recover from heirs or legatees when the circumstances
were such that his claim could not have been presented within the normal
period. MAss. GFN. LAWS ANx. ch. 197, §§ 28, 29 (1958). Pennsylvania deci-
sions are discussed in text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
12 Noel v. Robinson, 1 Vern. 90, 94, 23 Eng. Rep. 334, 336 (Ch. 1682).
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legacy. The reason for this limitation, as stated in a 1718 case, 13
has little relevance in present American law: the legatee who had
collected in full, the court said, was entitled to "retain the advantage
of his legal diligence, which the other legatees neglected by not
bringing their suit in time, before the wasting by the executor."'14
Administration of decedents' estates in this country will usually pre-
vent the occurrence of the problem, but when it does arise this
will rarely be an acceptable reason for refusing restitution. The
receipt of distribution by one legatee before another of the same class
will seldom be properly attributed to "legal diligence." There are
situations in which the unpaid legatee will be denied relief, but this
is where the assets later wasted have been set aside as a trust
fund for his benefit.
The exclusion of a case in which the executor had wasted assets
did not extend to other situations in which there was a depreciation
in the value of the estate after payment of the defendant's legacy.
From the earliest cases it was assumed that a bill by the unpaid
or underpaid legatee would lie where the deficiency in assets was
caused by events occurring after the payment.15 When suit was by an
unpaid creditor, courts likewise granted recovery from a legatee for
a deficiency of assets caused by events occurring after the payment;
nor was there any suggestion in the creditors' cases that the result
would be otherwise if the deficiency was produced by wrongful acts
of the executor. The executor would be accountable to the estate
in such circumstances, but if he were insolvent the only effective
remedy of the creditor or unpaid legatee might be restitution from
the defendant legatee.
Two developments occurred in connection with actions by one
legatee against another which, if accepted, placed serious limits on
the availability of the restitutionary remedy. The first development
appeared at least as early as 1751, in Orr v. Kaines,16 when the
court held that an unpaid legatee's action was solely against the
executor if the executor was solvent, as he was in that case-only if
he were insolvent, the court said, could the claimant proceed against
the overpaid legatee3 7 Moreover, the court said that the executor
13 Anonymous, 1 P. Wins. 495, 24 Eng. Rep. 487 (Ch. 1718).
14 Id., 24 Eng. Rep. at 488; accord, Walcott v. Hall, 2 Bro. C.C. 305, 29
Eng. Rep. 167 (Ch. 1788); Orr v. Kaines, 2 Ves. Sen. 194, 28 Eng. Rep. 125 (Ch.
1751).
15 Case cited note 12 supra. See also, 8 C. VhnmE, A GENERAL ABRDGE-
M-ENT Or LAW AND EQUITY 423 (1752): "So if one gets a decree for his legacy
and is paid, and afterwards a deficiency happens, he shall refund."
16 2 Ves. Sen. 194, 28 Eng. Rep. 125 (Ch.).
17 The decision was perhaps foreshadowed in Hodges v. Waddington, 2
Vent. 360, 86 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1684), where a creditor was granted resti-
tution from a legatee with the reporter's note that "the principal case went
upon the insolvency of the executor."
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would not be entitled to a refund since he had paid "voluntarily," with
the result that ultimate liability fell on the executor rather than
the legatee who received a benefit to which he was not entitled.
The overpayment in Orr v. Kaines arose out of a deficiency of
assets and for a long period thereafter it appeared that the de-
cision might be limited to such a situation. There were decisions
involving trusts, both inter vivos and testamentary, in which one
beneficiary was allowed restitution from another who had been
overpaid due to a mistake as to the extent of his interest, with no
suggestion that the trustee was insolvent or otherwise unable to
account.' s In present English law, however, under the decision in
In re Diplock,19 the true beneficiary apparently can recover from
the recipient of a benefit to which he is not entitled only if and to
the extent that he is unable to obtain satisfaction from the fiduciary.
Since the fiduciary's right to restitution is severely limited in English
law, the result will commonly be to place the ultimate loss from a
mistaken distribution on the fiduciary. But the situation is worse
than this: as will be seen hereinafter, the English courts have,
within limits left undefined, consciously chosen to throw the ultimate
burden on the fiduciary in the Diplock situation, rather than on the
recipient of the unjustified benefit. No corresponding doctrine de-
veloped in connection with creditor's actions against legatees or heirs.
In English law there is both a remarkable failure to do justice and
a remarkable failure to see the problem whole.
A second development occurred in 1876, in Rogers v. Ingham,20
where the plaintiff legatees claimed that a share of the estate that
should have gone to them was distributed by the executor to the
defendant under an erroneous construction of the will. The court
denied relief, without passing on the question of construction, on the
ground that restitution would not be given for mistake of law.
If the decision were to be read broadly, as denying recovery by the
true beneficiary because of the nature of the fiduciary's mistake,
it would be in conflict with earlier decisions in which restitution was
awarded on similar facts without discussing the nature of the mis-
take,21 as well as the cases giving restitution to a creditor where the
distribution was not caused by mistake. In fact, the court in Rogers
Is Dibbs v. Goren, 11 Beav. 483, 50 Eng. Rep. 904 (Rolls Ct. 1849) (testa-
mentary trust); Harris v. Harris (No. 2), 29 Beav. 110, 54 Eng. Rep. 568 (Rolls
Ct. 1861) (inter vivos trust).
10 [1948] Ch. 465, 503, aff'd sub noma. Ministry of Health v. Simpson,
[1951] A.C. 251 (H.L.).
20 L.R. 3 Ch. D. 351 (C.A. 1876).
21 In Dibbs v. Goren, 11 Beav. 483, 50 Eng. Rep. 904 (Rolls Ct. 1849),
where restitution from an overpaid beneficiary was awarded, the payment
had been made "under an erroneous view of the effect of the will," but the
court did not discuss the question whether the mistake was one of law or fact.
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v. Ingham treated the plaintiff beneficiary as though he were the
mistaken payor. The beneficiary had consented to the distribution
and the case was the same, one judge said, "as if the cestui que trust
had received the money from the trustee, and had herself paid it to
that person. '22 It is dubious reasoning, but nonetheless the reasoning
seems to limit the decision to restitution sought by one who must
base his claim on mistake of law. The refusal to give restitution to
a payor for mistake of law began in England in 1802,23 and this
seems to be the first case in which the doctrine was applied to mis-
taken distribution by a fiduciary. The limitation of the doctrine to
cases in which restitution was in substance sought by the payor was
later confirmed in In re Diplock, where executors and trustees had
mistakenly paid over £200,000 in estate funds to a number of charities
under an attempted testamentary trust which was invalid because of
indefiniteness of beneficiaries. The mistake was clearly one of law
but the Court of Appeal held that the next of kin were entitled to
restitution from the charities in equity. Although the court refused
to allow recovery in quasi-contract, this can be explained by the
severe and irrational restrictions placed on that remedy in modern
English law, restrictions which have no counterpart in this country.
One might perhaps conclude from the Ingham case that restitution
at suit of the fiduciary would be denied where his distribution was
produced by mistake of law, but more recent English cases have
cast doubt on this conclusion. The matter will be examined here-
inafter.
On the whole the complicated limitations on restitution to the
true beneficiary which have been introduced into English law have
not appeared in our cases. The English view that the action lies only
if recovery cannot be had from the fiduciary is implicitly rejected in
decisions granting restitution from the recipient of the benefit with-
out regard to the solvency or liability of the fiduciary. This is true
of cases in which distribution was made, through mistake of law or
fact, to one who was not an heir, legatee, or beneficiary, as well as
cases in which an overpayment was made to one who was a bene-
ficiary. Restitution has been granted in all of these situations, .nor has
it been refused because the mistake was one of law. In a Connecticut
case an heir believed to have predeceased the intestate was in fact
alive, and the court said he had an action to recover his share from
the other heirs to whom distribution had been made.24 In a Missouri
case the court ordered a refund in favor of one group of heirs against
22 3 Ch. D. at 355.
23 Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East. 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B. 1802).
24 Gray v. Goddard, 90 Conn. 561, 569, 98 A. 126, 129 (1916). The actual
decision was that the action of the omitted heirs against the administrator
was barred by the statute of limitations.
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another group, following distribution of the estate in the mistaken be-
lief that the heirs took per stirpes rather than per capita-clearly a
mistake of law.25 In a Michigan case the true heirs were awarded res-
titution of a distribution made to an adopted child in the mistaken be-
lief that he was an heir. The fact of adoption was known, but the law
was not. The court squarely rejected the view that restitution should
be denied because the mistake was one of law.26  In a New York
case in which a trustee by mistake of law had distributed to bene-
ficiaries funds to which they were not entitled, the beneficiaries who
were entitled obtained restitution.27
When one legatee has been paid in full and another legatee
seeks restitution because of an insufficiency of assets, there are state-
ments in a few American cases that repeat the doctrine found in
English law concerning a wasting of assets by the executor. Thus an
early New York case says:
There is a distinction, running through the cases, between an original
deficiency of assets and where the assets were sufficient, but had been
wasted by the executor. In the former case, a legatee who has been
paid more than his proportion under the deficiency must refund; but
in the latter case, he is not obliged to do so, for he has received no
more than what was due to him, and the other legatees must look to
the executor. The legatee who has been paid shall retain the ad-
vantage of his legal diligence. 28
That case, and other cases as well, which purport to rest on this
general principle found in English decisions, can be more satisfac-
torily explained on a different ground than that of rewarding a
legatee who has won a race of diligence. The will contained money
bequests to the plaintiffs, to be paid at ages which they had not
attained when the will took effect. The executors retained sufficient
funds to pay the bequests and distributed the balance to the residuary
legatees. Thereafter the executors "wasted" the assets held for the
plaintiffs. It was properly held that their only action was against
the executors as trustees. A trust fund had been set aside for their
benefit and thereafter their only rights were with respect to that
fund.29
_ 25 Aull v. St. Louis Trust Co., 149 Mo. 1, 50 S.W. 289 (1899).
26 Moritz v. Horsman, 305 Mich. 627, 9 N.W.2d 868 (1943).
27 In re Lawyers Title & Guar. Co., 270 App. Div. 294, 58 N.Y.S.2d 857
(1945).
28 Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. 614, 626-27 (N.Y. Ch. 1817). The sub-
stance of the statement is repeated in Buffalo Trust Co. v. Leonard, 154 N.Y.
141, 47 N.E. 966 (1897), but restitution was nonetheless awarded in favor of
money legatees who had not been paid, against the residuary legatees to
whom the estate had been distributed. The assets were sufficient to pay the
plaintiffs when distribution was made to the residuary legatees, but subse-
quently became insufficient because of misappropriation by and insolvency
of the executors.
29 This also explains Mills v. Smith, 141 N.Y. 256, 36 N.E. 178 (1894), as
well as Walcott v. Hall, 2 Bro. C.C. 306, 29 Eng. Rep. .167 (Ch. 1788). In the
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As the cases already cited suggest, restitution to the true bene-
ficiary has not been denied in this country because the distribution
was produced by mistake of law. The true beneficiary of a trust,
the true legatee, and the true next of kin have an equitable interest
in the assets in question and are entitled to recover from the recipient
on that ground alone, regardless of the circumstances that led to the
recipient's acquisition of assets to which he was not entitled. As said
in a New York case in which one beneficiary recovered from another:
The beneficiaries whose rights were defeated committed no mistake
either of law or of fact. They are not asking to be relieved from
their own act or deed, performed with knowledge of the facts, though
under mistake as to the law, but from the acts performed by another.
It would seem clear, upon principle at least, that the rule against the
recovery of money paid under mistake of law should not apply to
payments made by a trustee, or other fiduciary, of funds, the equitable
ownership of which was in third persons.30
Suit by the Fiduciary
When distribution to a legatee or next of kin left insufficient
assets to pay creditors' claims the early English cases were prepared
to grant restitution at suit of the personal representative in some cir-
cumstances, but with some uncertainty as to what those circumstances
were. In the earliest case found, Nelthrop v. Hill, decided in 1669,
there is a dictum stating that an executor may force a refund from a
legatee when debts of the estate are later discovered with insuf-
ficient assets to pay them.31 Later in the same century it was held
in Noel v. Robinson that the distribution was not recoverable if
"voluntary" and that it was voluntary unless the personal representa-
tive was "compelled" to pay.32 The facts of the case differed from
Nelthrop, however, in that the deficiency of assets arose after the dis-
tribution, due to the insolvency of two persons indebted to the
estate. The statement that the executor's distribution was "volun-
tary" is matched in the present law of restitution when relief is denied
to a "volunteer." Commonly, this means that the court is unable
to find any recognized ground for holding that the retention of a
New York case, on facts analogous to those in Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns Ch.
614 (N.Y. Ch. 1817), the court said: "The question . . . concerned the trust
fund and when that is found to have been set apart and held by the executors
out of the estate, it is no concern of [plaintiff's] how the distribution was made
of the rest of the estate to the residuary legatees. He is remitted to his remedy
against the executor or trustee, and for any breach of duty or of his trust on
his part he is without any claim against the distributees of this estate." 141
N.Y. at 264, 36 N.E. at 180.
30 In re Lawyers Title & Guar. Co., 270 App. Div. 294, 299, 58 N.Y.S.2d.
857, 861 (1945).
31 1 Ch. Cas. 135, 22 Eng. Rep. 730; accord, Chamberlain v. Chamberlain,
1 Ch. Cas. 256, 22 Eng. Rep. 788 (1675).
32 1 Vern. 91, 23 Eng. Rep. 334, 2 Vent. 358, 86 Eng. Rep. 484 (Ch 1682).
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benefit is unjust. The search for a ground was beginning in these
17th century cases. In the Nelthrop case the facts made it a case
of payment by mistake, in the mistaken belief, that is, that the
assets were then sufficient to pay both debts and legacies, whereas
in Noel v. Robinson there was no operative mistake at the time of
distribution to the legatee. Distribution under compulsion, however,
was conceived to provide a separate ground for restitution of the pay-
ment, as would be true also today.
In the following century Viner cited a case thought to be opposed
to Noel v. Robinson, justifying recovery by the executor of a "volun-
tary" payment on the ground that he "stands in the place of the
creditor."33  Although this is the preferable view, it remains un-
certain that present English law would grant restitution to the exec-
utor on the facts of Noel.34 The claim for restitution to a personal
representative is even more uncertain in English law when a legatee
has been overpaid at the expense of other legatees. A 17th century
case denied recovery on the ground that the distribution was volun-
tary rather than by compulsion, 35 and this position seems to have
been adhered to in later cases.36 Both problems are intimately re-
lated to the question as to who should bear the ultimate burden of
an improper distribution, and will be discussed again in that connec-
tion. If it is held, as it should be, that primary liability rests on
the recipient of the benefit, the personal representative who has
made a distribution which at the time seemed proper should be able
to recover on behalf of an unpaid creditor or legatee, or be sub-
rogated to the rights of a creditor or legatee whom he has paid.
In this country restitution has been regularly granted to a per-
sonal representative who made distribution to legatees or next of
kin in the mistaken belief that the assets remaining were sufficient
to pay the claims of creditors. In some instances the mistake consisted
of ignorance of a debt of the estate,37 in others the fiduciary was
mistaken as to the value of the assets.38  Restitution has likewise
been granted where the distribution resulted in a deficiency of assets
to pay other heirs or legatees,39 as well as where the personal repre-
33 Davis v. Davis, 22 Eng. Rep. 466 (Ch. 1718), cited in 8 C. VxNma, supra
note 15, at 423.
34 E. WILLiAMS, EXECUTORS AND ADMImSTRATORS § 1339 (14th ed. 1960).
35 Newman v. Barton, 2 Vern. 205, 23 Eng. Rep. 733 (Ch. 1690).
36 Hilliard v. Fulford, L.R. 4 Ch. D. 389 (1876); Orr v. Kaines, 2 Ves. Sen.
194, 28 Eng. Rep. 125 (Ch. 1751) (dictum). But cf. Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P.
Wins. 443, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (Ch. 1727).
37 Clifton v. Clifton, 54 Fla. 535, 45 So. 458 (1907) (restitution from
heir); Cutright v. Stanford, 81 Ill. 240 (1876) (restitution from heirs); Walker
v. Hill, 17 Mass. 380, 385 (1821) (dictum).
38 Buchanan v. Pue, 31 Md. 85, 6 Gill. 112 (1847) (restitution from
legatees).
39 Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64 (1849) (restitution from overpaid
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sentative distributed estate funds to the wrong person, for example,
to one mistakenly believed to be an heir.40
The principal dissent from these views is in Pennsylvania which
has refused restitution to the personal representative, whether the
distribution resulted in an insufficiency of assets to pay creditors,41
or other legatees. 42 These decisions are associated with the refusal
of the Pennsylvania courts to grant restitution at suit of the
creditor or the underpaid legatee or heir.43  The basic position is
that the overpaid legatee or heir may retain a benefit to which he
was not initially entitled, simply because he received it. The decisions
stem principally from Montgomery's Appeal,44 where the court justi-
fied the denial of restitution as follows: "It would be a great hard-
ship upon distributees, to whom an administrator has voluntarily
made payments on account of their shares, if they may be called
upon for repayment after the lapse of years. They may have spent
it, or increased their style of living in entire good faith, and in
ignorance of any over-payment. ' 45 This type of hardship may occur
whenever restitution of a mistaken payment is sought, but the possi-
bility of such hardship has not caused most courts to refuse relief.
Instead, inquiry is made in the particular case to determine whether,
because of change of position on the faith of the payment, it would
be inequitable to order restitution in whole or in part. It seems
unlikely that the Pennsylvania court will extend this protection to
the recipient of a mistaken distribution who was not in fact an heir,
legatee or beneficiary,46 even though the reason given in Montgomery's
Appeal could be said to extend to such a case.
Mistake of Law
In some of the American cases granting restitution to a personal
representative the mistake was one of law, but this was not thought
next of kin); Smith v. Smith, 76 Ind. 236 (1881) (restitution from overpaid
legatee); Stokes v. Goodykoontz, 126 Ind. 535, 26 N.E. 391 (1891) (restitution
from overpaid next of kin); Walker v. Hill, 17 Mass. 380, 384-85 (1821)
(dictum); Lyle v. Siler, 103 N.C. 261, 9 S.E. 491 (1889) (restitution from next
of kin); Roach v. Underwood, 192 Tenn. 378, 241 S.W.2d 498 (1950) (restitu-
tion from next of kin).
40 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood, 321 Mass. 519, 74 N.E.2d 1 (1947).
41 Montgomery's Appeal, 92 Pa. 202 (1879).
42 Bomgardner v. Blatt, 35 Pa. Super. 361 (1908).
43 Fitzgerald's Estate, 266 Pa. 321, 109 A. 635 (1920); Ferguson v. Yard,
164 Pa. 586, 30 A. 517 (1894).
44 92 Pa. 202 (1879). The Pennsylvania cases are discussed in Farage,
Restitution in Pennsylvania of Overpayments Made by Executors or Admin-
istrators to Distributees, 12 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 30 (1940).
45 92 Pa. at 206.
46 Union Trust Co. v. Gilpin, 235 Pa. 524, 84 A. 448 (1912).
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sufficient to prevent recovery.47 There are, however, some decisions
denying restitution for this reason,48 and this general position, unfor-
tunately, was adopted by the Restatement of Restitution.49
Before discussing the specific problem it may be useful to make
a short excursion into the general topic of restitution for mistake
of law. The discussion is confined to mistake in performance,
where the recipient has received a benefit through a mistaken pay-
ment or other transfer for which he has neither given nor agreed to
give anything in exchange.
In early English law, courts relieved against mistake without
regard to whether it was of fact or law,50 but in 1802, in Bilbie v.
Lumley,51 Lord Ellenborough committed a "monstrous mistake of
law"52 in denying restitution of a money payment not owed on the
ground that the payor knew the facts and was in error only as to the
applicable law. The distinction has been condemned almost univer-
sally by writers5 3 and very commonly by judges, as in Lord Wright's
47 Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548 (1849) (executor); Mansfield v.
Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 22 A. 313 (1890); Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64 (1849)
(administrator); Roach v. Underwood, 192 Tenn. 378, 241 S.W.2d 498 (1950)
(administrator).
48 Harding v. Hewes, 87 N.H. 488, 179 A. 343 (1935) (administrator); In
re Welton's Estate, 141 Misc. 674, 253 N.Y.S. 128 (1931) (administrator);
Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898); Scott v. Ford, 45 Ore.
531, 78 P. 742 (1904), rehearing denied 45 Ore. 550, 80 P. 899 (1905), affd on
subsequent appeal, 52 Ore. 288, 97 P. 99 (1908) (executor). Other cases, most
relatively old, are cited in Annot., 147 A.L.R. 121 (1943).
49 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 45 (1937) (especially Illustration No. 1).
The position of the Restatement is described more fully in note 73 infra.
50 Hewer v. Bartholomew, Cro. Eliz. 614, 78 Eng. Rep. 855 (K.B. 1597);
Bonnel v. Foulke, 2 Sid. 4, 82 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1657); Lansdown v. Lans-
down, Mos. 364, 25 Eng. Rep. 441, 2 Jac. & W. 205, 37 Eng. Rep. 605 (Ch. 1730);
Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wins. 315, 24 Eng. Rep. 1081 (Ch. 1734); Farmer v.
Arundel, 2 W. Black 824, 96 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1772) (dictum); Bize v. Dick-
ason, 1 Term Rep. 285, 99 Eng. Rep. 1097 (K.B. 1786). In Lansdown and
Pusey the cases were in equity; the others were actions at law, in quasi-con-
tract.
51 2 East. 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B. 1802). The case was probably
rightly decided, though for the wrong reason. The rule announced was ac-
cepted and applied in Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143, 128 Eng. Rep. 641
(C.P. 1813).
52 Patterson, Improvements in the Law of Restitution, 40 CORNELL L.Q.
667, 676 (1955).
53 W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 85-87 (1893); F. WoODwARD, QUASI CON-
TRACT §§ 35-42 (1913); J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICMVIENT 130-31 (1951); W.
MARKBY, ELEMENTS oF LAW §§ 268-71 (4th ed. 1889); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1581 (rev. ed. 1937); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 616-17 (1960); RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 43, at 179-81 (1937); Foulke, Mistake in the Formation and
Performance of a Contract, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 320 (1911); Patterson,
Improvements in the Law of Restitution, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 667, 676 (1955).
Patterson's statement that the denial of relief for mistake of law is limited to
law as opposed to equity cannot be accepted with respect to American law,
,although it may be the tendency of English decisions. In re Diplock, [1948]
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observation that it "originated in a hasty and ill-considered utterance
of Lord Ellenborough"; 54 nonetheless it has had and continues to
have great influence on the course of decision.
The reason given by Lord Ellenborough for denying restitution
of money paid by mistake of law was that "[e]very man must be
taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to
what extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried."55 As more
commonly expressed, "everyone is presumed to know the law." If
this is to be regarded as one of those presumptions resting on probable
fact, it is manifestly without foundation.56 As an English court said
in an early case in which relief was given for mistake of law, "it
seems hard, a young woman should suffer for her ignorance of the
law" when the rule of law was one on which the judges were "till
very lately" in disagreement. 57 But Ellenborough was stating a rule
of law, not a presumption grounded in fact, and the proper inquiry
is whether it is supported by reasons of policy strong enough to
justify retention of a payment to which the recipient was not en-
titled, when the payment was made in the mistaken belief that he
was. There are no reasons of policy sufficient to justify this result.
It is true that ignorance of law does not usually enable a person
to escape the application of that law to his acts. This is thought to
be necessary to the maintenance of the public order or to the enforce-
ment of rules having a regulatory function. No useful presumption
is involved; instead a decision has been made that the rule of law
in question is one of general application, binding on all who come
within its terms. In general, one does not escape criminal responsi-
bility or tort liability, or liability for breach of contract, by pleading
ignorance of the law,58 nor does he escape the application of the
1 Ch. 465, affd sub nom. Ministry of Health v. Simpson, [1951] A.C. 251
(H.L.); F. WOODWARD, supra § 38.
54 R. WRIGHT, Preface to LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES xiX (1939). He
uses this as an instance in which "the dead hand of the past fastens on the
living present."
55 Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East. 469, 472, 102 Eng. Rep. 448, 449 (K.B. 1802).
56 "The idea that equity has no relief from mistakes of law had its origin
in the almost humorous and wholly suppositious presumption that all know
the law-a proposition contrary to both law and sense." Peterson v. First
Nat'l Bank, 162 Minn. 369, 375, 203 N.W. 53, 55 (1925).
57 Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wms. 315, 320-21, 24 Eng. Rep. 1081, 1082-83
(Ch. 1734).
58 "Ignorance of law, of either the civil or the moral code, should not
excuse a rational being from the prescribed responsibility for a voluntary
violation of it; because, so far as civil and moral conduct may be concerned,
it is the duty of every intelligent citizen and moral agent to know the law
and his own obligations, and no government, moral or political, could prevail
or be upheld, if a plea of voluntary ignorance would excuse an infraction of
its prescribed rules of conduct ....
'"ut the same reasoning does not apply to contracts, or to private
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statute of limitations because he mistakenly thought the period was
longer than the one in fact prescribed. 59 But this last example serves
to bring out the irrelevancy of a mistake of law analysis, for the
result would be the same were the mistake one of fact, for example,
the date of occurrence of the event that gave rise to the cause of
action.60 In all of these instances the party is seeking to escape the
application of a rule of law. In the restitution cases with which we
are now concerned he is not-on the contrary he makes the rule of
law a part of his case and seeks restitution of the performance because
he was mistaken as to that rule. Policies applied to mistake of law
in the first situation have no bearing on the solution of the second.
Rather than trying to escape the consequences of a rule of law the
plaintiff seeks to escape consequences that would not have occurred
had the law been known and observed. In a very general sense it
can be said that he seeks to bring the situation into conformity with
the rule of law, by asserting rights based upon it.
The rule refusing restitution for mistake of law is ill-advised,
yet it must be recognized that it is commonly followed as to mistakes
in performance, particularly when the performance is a money pay-
ment.6' Even so, the rule should not be applied to mistaken distri-
bution by a fiduciary for reasons best seen by considering the case
rights .... [I] f one, ignorant of a plain principle of law, shall, without any
other motive or consideration than an erroneous opinion respecting his legal
rights and obligations, release a right, pay money, or undertake to do any act,
what principle of law, or dictate of justice or policy, would require him to
be bound, as with a Gordian Knot, which nothing but the sword could loose?
"Why should he be punished in such a case, for such ignorance? or why
should the other party be enriched or benefited, without any equivalent or
merit of any kind or to any extent whatsoever?" Underwood v. Brockman,
34 Ky. 209, 214 (1836) (italics deleted). Keener argues for the same distinc-
tion in W. KEENER, QUAsI-CoNTRAcTs 91 (1893).
Similarly, a trustee does not normally escape liability for breach of trust
by pleading ignorance of the law proscribing the act in question, although the
lack of bad faith may have a bearing on the extent of liability. The issue
was presented in Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
59 Richey v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 123 Conn. 360, 195 A. 732
(1937).
60 In this instance a person seeks to use mistake in order to escape the
consequences of a rule of law, the statute of limitations. The restitution
problem arises when he relies upon that rule as a basis of relief. Thus, if one
pays an obligation in the mistaken belief that it is enforceable when in fact
action is barred by the statute of limitations, restitution will be denied but
this is not because the mistake may have been one of law. The result would
be the same were the mistake wholly factual. The reason for refusing resti-
tution lies in the judicial attitude toward statutes of limitation: even though
enforcement of the obligation is barred the obligation is not wholly dis-
charged and retention of a mistaken payment is not unjust. Barr v. Payne,
298 Mich. 85, 298 N.W. 460 (1941); Clifton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d
577 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935).
61 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Reporters' Notes at 35-50 (1937); J.
DAWSON & G. PALmER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 808-12 (1958).
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in which restitution is sought by the true beneficiary. As we have
seen, in the American decisions it makes no difference to the bene-
.ficiary's action whether the fiduciary's mistake was of fact or law.
62
In truth it makes no difference whether there was mistake at all.
63
If a fiduciary transfers funds to D knowing that they are held for
the benefit of B, the latter can obtain restitution on the strength of
his equitable title which is not cut off unless D is a bona fide
.purchaser. Such transfers usually occur because of mistake but
mistake is not an essential element of B's claim, hence the fact that
the mistake was one of law is irrelevant.
When the fiduciary seeks restitution on behalf of the beneficiary,
the rights between the beneficiary and the defendant are really in
issue and the fact that the mistake, if there was one, was of law
should not bar restitution. This was recognized by the Massachusetts
court in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood,64 where a trustee turned the
principal of a trust over to an adopted daughter of the life tenant
in the belief that she was the person meant by the language of the
.trust under which principal was to go to the life tenant's heirs. The
court held that an adopted child was not an "heir" within the meaning
of the trust instrument; conceded for purposes of decision that the
trustee's mistake might be analyzed as one of law; but held nonethe-
less that he could obtain restitution for the benefit of the true benefici-
aries. The trust property was impressed with the trust in the hands
of the defendant and the trustee "had standing to bring the petition
in behalf of the interests of those entitled."65
This conclusion is taken for granted, I believe, in the adminis-
tration of trusts. There are countless cases in which a trustee makes
a mistake of law as to the relative rights of the income and principal
beneficiaries, resulting in the distribution of trust receipts to the
wrong beneficiary. Almost as a matter of course the beneficiary who
received funds or property to which he was not entitled will be
ordered to make restitution to the trust, for the benefit of the rightful
beneficiary. 6 The nature of the relief given tends to be concealed
by the manner in which the issue is raised, typically in a proceeding
62 Cases are cited in notes 25-27, 30 supra. In English law the question
is complicated by In re Diplock, [1948] Ch. 465, affd sub nom. Ministry of
Health v. Simpson, [1951] A.C. 251 (H.L.), where the court said that mistake
of law would bar restitution at law (quasi-contract) but not in equity. The
distinction has nothing to commend it. See Chafee, Book Review, 36 CoRNML
L.Q. 170, 174 (1950).
63 A. ScoTT, TRusTs § 254.2 (3d ed. 1967).
64 321 Mass. 519, 74 N.E.2d 141 (1947).
65 Id. at 527, 74 N.E.2d at 146.
66 An example is In re Stem's Trust, 87 N.Y.S.2d 128, 131 (Sup. Ct. 1949),
where the order read: "the trustee and life beneficiaries are directed to re-
store to principal the amount of accrued interest which was paid over as in-
come ......
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to approve the trustee's accounts. When the order takes the form of
disallowing the trustee's payment and ordering the beneficiary to
restore the amount to which he is not entitled, this is in substance the
same as a judgment in favor of the trustee in an action against'a
beneficiary to recover a payment made by mistake of law. When for
some reason 7 the issue arises in an independent action by the trustee
against the beneficiary the result should be the same.6 8 Nor should
it matter whether or not the trustee has made good to the beneficiary
entitled to the distribution. If he has not, his suit is on behalf of
that beneficiary, whereas if he has he is subrogated to the rights
of the beneficiary. 69 The basic policy decision is that as between the
fiduciary and the recipient of the benefit the ultimate responsibility
for making the true beneficiary whole is on the recipient. Subrogation
goes by analogy to numerous other instances in which a person who
discharges an obligation on which he is only secondarily liable is
subrogated to the creditor's rights against the one primarily liable.
Nonetheless, there are decisions denying restitution to a fiduciary
because his mistake was one of law, all of them involving mistaken
67 In re Underhill, 117 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 1120 (1889), where the executor
overpaid a legatee, it was held in his final accounting, first, that he was
entitled to credit only for the amount due the legatee but, second, that he
could not obtain an order for restitution in the accounting proceeding. The
overpayment was a matter "between him and such legatee" and he could
obtain restitution only in an independent action. In a trust accounting, where
overpayment has been to an income beneficiary, the matter is commonly
worked out by deducting the amount of the overpayment from future install:
ments of income. In re Schell's Estate, 82 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sur. Ct. 1943).
68 In re Lawyers Title & Guar. Co., 270 App. Div. 294, 58 N.Y.S.2d 857
(1945) (dictum); A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 254 (3d ed. 1967). English cases are to
the same effect. In re Ainsworth, [1915] 2 Ch. 96; In re Musgrave, [1916] 2
Ch. 417. In the Musgrave case the court considered the mistake of law argu-
ment and held it inapplicable; it was proper to "adjust the right between the
cestui que trust and the trustee who has overpaid though an honest and, so
to speak, permissible mistake of construction . . . ." [1916] 2 Ch. at 425.
69 Subrogation was used as early as 1718 in allowing an executor to re-
cover from a legatee where the remaining assets proved to be insufficient to
pay debts. Davis v. Davis, 22 Eng. Rep. 466 (Ch 1718), described in'8 C.
VInER, supra note 15, at 423. In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood, -321 Mass. 519,
74 N.E.2d 141 (1947); where the mistake was one of law,. the court was. of the
opinion that the mistaken trustee could recover either-on-his own behalf or
on behalf of the beneficiaries.
In Hood v. Claphan, 19 Beav. 90, 94,'52 Eng. Rep: 282, 284 (Rolls "C.-"1854),
a trustee overpaid one beneficiary at the expense of another and was. held li-
able to the latter in the amount of the overpayment. But in the same proceed-
ing it was decreed that the trustee recover the overpayment from the recipient.
As counsel for the trustee said in argument, he "ought to be indemnified out of
the estates of the tenants for life, who have received the benefit .... ." Al-
though the nature of the mistake was not discussed it may have been a mis-
take of law. The solution is just, but difficult to square with In re Diplock,
[1948] Ch. 465 (C.A.), af'd sub nom. Ministry of Health v. Simpson, [1951]
A.C. 251 (H.L.).
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distribution by the personal representative of a decendent's estate.7 0
An executor or administrator who holds legal title to the decedent's
property does so in order to perform different functions from those
of a trustee, but he holds his title nonetheless for the benefit of the
distributees or legatees and his right to recover a mistaken transfer
on their behalf should be the same as the right of the trustee of
an express trust. Similarly, if he has satisfied his liability to the
distributees or legatees he is entitled to be subrogated to their rights
against the recipient.71 The denial of relief in these cases seems to
result primarily from inadequate analysis, as in the one-sentence
opinion of the New Hampshire court denying restitution to an ad-
ministrator who overpaid next of kin in the mistaken belief that
they took per stirpes instead of of per capita. The law is well
settled, the court said, "that money voluntarily paid under a mistake
of law cannot be recovered. ' 72  The statement ignores the factors
that set this mistaken payment apart from the generality of cases
involving mistake of law.
Ordinarily the personal representative or other fiduciary who
mistakenly overpays a beneficiary, or pays a person who has no
right, will be personally liable to the true beneficiary. Where he is
denied restitution because his mistake was one of law, this has the
undesirable consequence of giving the true beneficiary the option of
throwing the ultimate liability on either the fiduciary or the recipient
of the mistaken payment. He can choose the recipient by proceeding
directly against him, in which case mistake of law is no defense.
Or he can choose the fiduciary by holding him accountable in the
first instance, which leaves the fiduciary without recourse against
the recipient. It is not wise to give the beneficiary this choice when
ultimate liability should in all justice be borne by the person who
received assets to which he had no claim.
The Question of Ultimate Liability
The assertion that ultimate liability will be placed on the recipient
of the benefit where suit is by the true beneficiary is fully supported
in American law, except for Pennsylvania. In England, on the other
hand, there are cases holding that the true beneficiary must look in
70 Cases are cited in note 48 supra.
71 Restitution for mistake of law was granted to an administrator in such
a situation in Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64 (1849), where an heir who
was entitled to take by representation was omitted from the distribution. In
most of the cases on the point, the facts do not disclose whether or not the
personal representative had satisfied his liability to the estate.
72 Harding v. Hewes, 87 N.H. 488, 179 A. 343 (1935). The situation was
similarly regarded as one calling for application of the general rule against
restitution for mistake of law in Scott v. Ford, 45 Ore. 531, 78 P. 742 (1905),
rehearing denied, 45 Ore. 550, 80 P. 899 (1905).
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the first instance to the fiduciary-restitution from the one who
received the benefit is allowed only if and to the extent that the
plaintiff is unable to obtain satisfaction from the fiduciary. This is
not an instance in which final liability may fall on the fiduciary
because of piecemeal decision, as has occurred in this country with
respect to mistake of law. If a court will grant restitution at suit
of the true beneficiary, but deny it at suit of the fiduciary (and this
apparently is what might happen if it followed the Restatement rules
on mistake of law),73 the consequence may be to impose the ultimate
burden on the fiduciary without having considered the justice of
such a result. In the English decisions, however, the courts have
sometimes purported to consider that question, and having done so
have come to the extraordinary conclusion that ultimate liability
should fall on the fiduciary.
In Hilliard v. Futford,74 the executor, without court order,
distributed the residuary estate to five legatees but in the present
proceeding it was held that a sixth person was entitled to an equal
share. The bequest was a class gift and evidently the executors
were mistaken as to when the class closed, although this issue was
not discussed in the reported decision. The executors had paid the
share of the sixth legatee out of their own funds, and with respect
to their right to refund from the overpaid legatees Jessel had this
73 The position of the Restatement is difficult to describe accurately. The
general position taken in section 45 is that restitution will be denied where
the mistake is solely one of law. Illustration No. 1 is as follows: "A is the
administrator of B's estate. As such, erroneously interpreting the law of
descent, he pays money to C as next of kin. C shares the mistake. A is not
entitled to restitution from C." In comment c to section 45, however, it is
pointed out that if a third person has legal or equitable ownership of the
assets transferred he is entitled to restitution from the transferee even though
the mistake is one of law. Finally it is observed that the fiduciary may be
able to maintain the action on behalf of this third person. If this person has
only equitable title as beneficiary of a trust, the Restatement of Trusts takes
the position that the trustee may recover on his behalf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 294, comment c (1959).
To return to Illustration No. 1, supra: If the estate was personal prop-
erty, the administrator received legal title in most states, but he holds this
title for the benefit of the next of kin. If the next of kin were D he would
have equitable title to the same extent as the beneficiary of an express trust.
He would be able to obtain restitution under comment c even though the
mistake was one of law (a topic elaborated in section 126 of the Restatement
of Restitution), and the administrator likewise would be able to sue on his
behalf. If the conclusion asserted in Illustration No. 1 is not in conflict with
comment c it is to say the least misleading. Presumably the illustration
would apply where the administrator had satisfied his liability to D and then
sued C. This is not always the case however, which means that the position
taken in the illustration is too broad. In addition, it is argued in the present
text that restitution should be granted to the administrator in this case as
well.
74 L.R. 4 Ch. D. 389 (1876). The decision is an outgrowth of Orr v.
Kaines, 2 Ves. Sen. 194, 28 Eng. Rep. 125 (Ch. 1751).
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to say: "Of course you cannot make these other residuary legatees
pay back anything.... Therefore the difference ... will in substance
have to be made good by the executors who wrongly distributed
the estate: they who have made the error will have to pay for it.
Upon these grounds I think justice will [be] done."75
The same curious sense of justice was expressed in In re Diplock,76
where executors and trustees, without prior adjudication of the va-
lidity of the trust, mistakenly paid out over £200,000 in estate funds
to a number of charities under an attempted testamentary trust
which was invalid because of indefiniteness of beneficiaries. In a suit
by the next of kin to obtain restitution from the charities the court
of appeal said: "Since the original wrong payment was attributable
to the blunder of the personal representatives, the right of the
unpaid beneficiary is in the first instance against the wrongdoing
executor or administrator: and the beneficiary's direct claim in
equity against those overpaid or wrongly paid should be limited to
the amount which he cannot recover from the party responsible."77
This is an indefensible position. The only "wrong" of which the exec-
utors were guilty was the distribution of estate funds in the mistaken
belief that the trust was valid. The funds belonged in equity to the
next of kin and they could hold the executors personally accountable.
But there was no wrong to the charities; they merely benefited from
the executor's mistake. It is a perversion of justice to conclude that
as between the executors and the charities the former should
bear the ultimate liability-imposition of full liability on the execu-
tors would burden them with a £200,000 loss, whereas it would merely
take from the charities an unjustified gain.78 A personal representa-
tive or trustee can usually protect himself against personal liability
by obtaining an appropriate court decree before distribution, but his
failure to do so is not a valid reason for placing the ultimate liability
on him.
Both of these English decisions apparently involved mistake of
law, but in neither case did the court rest its opinion on that factor,
nor is there anything in the reasoning to suggest that it is more
"wrongful" to mistake the law than the facts. Although the scope
of the doctrine remains uncertain,79 that is not cause for serious
75 L.R. 4 Ch. D. at 394.
76 [1948] Ch. 465 (C.A.), aff'd sub nom. Ministry of Health v. Simpson,
[1951] A.C. 251 (H.L.).
77 Id. at 503.
78 Any equity in favor of the charities would depend upon change of
position in reliance on the mistaken additions to their wealth. This aspect of
the case is discussed in G.K. Scott, Restitution From an Innocent Transferee
who is not a Purchaser for Value, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1002 (1949).
79 It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile all of the English decisions.
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concern as to American law since the doctrine is not likely to
be followed here.80 It is true that it has been repeated in some
American writings,8' but in the decisions as a whole it has been
implicitly rejected. It is rejected in the cases granting restitution at
suit of the true beneficiary without regard to the liability of the
fiduciary.82 Similarly, the cases granting restitution to the fiduciary
without considering his personal liability, or after he has discharged
his personal liability, must go on the premise that the ultimate burden
should fall on the recipient of the mistaken distribution.
II.
Restiiuiion from Actual or Supposed Creditors
If through mistake a personal representative pays a debt not
owed, for example a debt that had actually been paid during the
lifetime of the decedent, he will doubtless be awarded restitution.8 3
A more troublesome case arises when the debt paid by the personal
representative is valid but has not been properly filed in the de-
cedent's estate so as to entitle the creditor to payment. The issue
is close and the few cases on the point are in disagreement. Nor-
mally, one who mistakenly pays a debt which is not enforceable,
because barred by the statute of limitations or for some similar
reason, will be denied restitution since it is not inequitable for the
recipient to retain the payment.84 This is an expression of the judicial
attitude toward the statute of limitations and similar defenses, in a
Thus, Harris v. Harris (No. 2), 29 Beav. 110, 54 Eng. Rep. 568 (Rolls Ct. 1861),
seems in conflict with Diplock. See also Dibbs v. Goren, 11 Beav. 483, 50 Eng.
Rep. 904 (Rolls Ct. 1849).
The doctrine was never extended to distributions which were at the ex-
pense of creditors of an estate.
80 In Bomgardner v. Blatt, 35 Pa. Super. 361, 366 (1908), the executor
was denied recovery of an overpayment made to a legatee through mistake
of fact. The court assumed that the executor was personally accountable to
the estate and observed that he "must bear the loss occasioned by his own
mistake." The decision reflects the unusual development of Pennsylvania
law. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
81 An example is Joseph Warren's inelegant statement that the "benefi-
ciary must first exhaust the personal representative." Warren, Problems in
Probate and Administration, 32 HARv. L. REV. 315, 337 (1919).
82 Moritz v. Horsman, 305 Mich. 627, 9 N.W.2d 868 (1943); In re Lawyers
Title & Guar. Co., 270 App. Div. 294, 58 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1945); cases cited notes
24-27 supra.
83 Restitution was granted in such circumstances in Pooley v. Ray, 1 P.
Wins. 354, 24 Eng. Rep. 423 (Ch. 1717), at suit, however, of the heirs instead of
the personal representative. The case would be too clear for argument if the
creditor knew he was being paid a second time, but even though he did not
there is little doubt that a refund will be ordered. In the Pooley case the cred-
itor was dead and his executor received payment in the honest belief that the
debt was outstanding.
84 RESTATEENm OF RESTiTUTION § 61 (1937); note 60 supra.
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case that merely involves weighing the equities between the debtor
and creditor. In the present instance however, the personal repre-
sentative will probably have to bear the loss unless he is able to
obtain restitution, which makes the equities more nearly equal. None-
theless, he must establish that the creditor's retention of the payment
is unjust and it seems that this is not the case.8 5
Most actions by a personal representative against a creditor of a
decedent's estate occur because the representative paid a debt in the
belief that the estate was solvent when in fact it was not. Nearly
all authority in this country awards restitution to the executor or
administrator to the extent of the overpayment. 6  It has been sug-
gested that relief should be denied if the mistake was one of law,8 7
but this was rejected by the Connecticut court in Mansfield v.
Lynch s in granting restitution where the mistake was clearly one
of law. Relief is available both where the personal representative has
satisfied his liability to the other creditors"9 and where he has not.90
85 Restitution was denied in Graham McNeil Co. v. Scarborough, 135
Miss. 59, 99 So. 502 (1924); Adams v. Smith, 19 Nev. 259, 9 P. 337, rehearing
denied, 19 NEv. 278, 10 P. 353 (1886). In the Mississippi case the adminis-
trator's credit for the payment was disallowed on final accounting, which
meant that the loss fell on him personally. In each case the administrator's
mistake was one of law and the courts gave this as a reason for refusing
relief. In addition, however, the Nevada court thought that the payment was
not recoverable because the debt was "legally exigible." In Miner v. Ray-
mond, 113 Mich. 28, 71 N.W. 501 (1897), restitution was granted without
suggesting mistake or any other ground.
86 Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 22 A. 313 (1890) (mistake of law);
Wolf v. Beaird, 123 Ill. 585, 15 N.E. 161 (1888); Morris v. Porter, 87 Me. 510,
33 A. 15 (1895); Chestertown Bank v. Perkins, 154 Md. 456, 140 A. 834 (1927);
Walker v. Hill, 17 Mass. 380 (1821); Heard v. Drake, 70 Mass. 514 (1855);
Woodruff v. H.B. Claflin Co., 198 N.Y. 470, 91 N.E. 1103 (1910); Thorsen v.
Hooper, 57 Ore. 75, 109 P. 388 (1910). Other cases are cited in RESTATEMENT
OF RESTruToN, Reporters' Notes, at 16 (1937).
English decisions on the point are not useful because of differences in the
practices with respect to payment of claims against an insolvent estate. See
Walker v. Hill, 17 Mass. at 383-85. Nonetheless, the early case of Pooley v.
Ray, 1 P. Wins. 358, 24 Eng. Rep. 423 (Ch. 1717), supports restitution to the
personal representative when the facts are analogous to those occurring in
the American cases.
87 Thorsen v. Hooper, 57 Ore. 75, 109 P. 388 (1910).
88 59 Conn. 320, 22 A. 313 (1890).
89 Wolf v. Beaird, 123 111. 585, 15 N.E. 161 (1888).
90 Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 22 A. 313 (1890); Morris v. Porter,
87 Me. 510, 33 A. 15 (1895); Chestertown Bank v. Perkins, 154 Md. 456, 140
A. 834 (1927). In some of the cases decreeing restitution in favor of the
executor or administrator the report does not disclose whether or not he had
discharged his liability to the creditors-the fact was evidently considered
irrelevant. E.g., Woodruff v. H.B. Claflin Co., 198 N.Y. 470, 91 N.E. 1103
(1910). Joseph Warren's statement that the personal representative's "right
should exist only when he has been obliged to make the creditor whole" (a
statement made in discussing suits against legatees or distributees) is unsup-
ported in the cases and lacking in merit. Warren, Problems in Probate and
Administration, 32 HAv. L. REV. 315, 335 (1919).
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Restitution to the personal representative was denied in early
cases from Kentucky,91 Pennsylvania 2 and Virginia,93 for reasons
that are not persuasive. The principal reason given was that the
defendant had an "honest debt" and was entitled to retain money
paid in discharge of that debt.9 4 Although there has been an attempt
in recent times to support this reasoning,95 surely the court in
Mansfield v. Lynch9 6 provided a sufficient answer in concluding
that the defendant's only right was "to receive her pro rata share,"
so that the excess constituted an unjust enrichment. The Kentucky
court emphasized the negligence of the administrator in paying the
debt without sufficient examination of the assets and liabilities. But
there are numerous cases in which a mistaken payment of money
not due has been held recoverable despite the negligence of the
payor,97 and there is no reason for different treatment of a payor
who is an executor or administrator. The rule in Kentucky has
been changed by a statute authorizing restitution of an overpayment
made to a creditor "under a mistake as to the solvency of the
estate."9 8
The solution of these problems may be affected today by statutes
dealing with the payment of a decedent's debts. This is true, for
example, in Massachusetts, where restitution was granted in Walker
v. Hill, 9 in an action by a personal representative against an overpaid
creditor, in perhaps the earliest decision of the issue in this country.
By Massachusetts statute a personal representative may pay debts
of the estate after 6 months from the approval of his bond, without
incurring any liability to creditors of whose claims he has no notice,
provided that at the time of payment the representative had no
notice "of demands against the estate of the deceased sufficient to
warrant him to represent such estate to be insolvent."'0 0 If this
leaves assets of the estate insufficient to pay claims thereafter de-
manded, the latter creditors are entitled only to share in the remaining
estate, and "the creditors of the deceased who have been previously
paid shall not be liable to repay any part of the amount received by
91 Lawson's Adm'rs v. Hansborough, 49 Ky. 147 (1849).
92 Carson v. M'Farland, 2 Rawle 118 (Pa. 1828).
93 Findlay v. Trigg's Adm'r, 83 Va. 539, 3 S.E. 142 (1887).
94 This reason was used in the Pennsylvania case (note 92 supra) and
accepted in the Virginia case (note 93 supra).
95 Farage, 12 PA. B. Ass'x Q. 30, 32 (1940).
96 59 Conn. 320, 22 A. 313 (1890).
97 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 187 Wis. 93, 203
N.W. 738 (1925); F. WOODWARD, QuAsI CONTRACTS § 15 (1913).
98 Ky. REV. STAT. § 396.140 (1962). The statute also provides for recovery
of mistaken distributions to a legatee or distributee.
99 17 Mass. 380 (1821).
100 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 197, § 2 (1958).
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them." 01 This means that if the statutory procedure is followed the
"overpaid" creditor is entitled to retain the payment and the personal
representative is protected against personal liability. The limited
application of the statute, however, is illustrated by the fact that it
would not cover the situation presented in Walker v. Hill, where
the mistake as to the solvency of the estate occurred, not because there
were unknown claims but because of an excessive valuation of some
of the assets in the estate.
In.
Conclusion
When distribution of a decedent's estate to heirs or legatees
leaves insufficient funds to pay creditors of the decedent, it is reason-
ably clear that the unpaid creditors will be granted restitution from
the recipient of the payment. English authority was to this effect
from an early time and it is to be expected that courts in this
country will follow the same course. If relief is sought in the first
instance by the personal representative, restitution by the heir or
legatee is nearly always ordered in this country if the payment was
induced by mistake of fact. Where the mistake was one of law there
is apt to be a difference of opinion, but it seems highly preferable
to grant relief in this situation as well. In truth, restitution should
not necessarily turn on the presence of mistake, whether of fact or
law. No doubt a personal representative would be refused relief if
he distributed estate funds to an heir or legatee knowing that they
had no right to the funds, but if the distribution seemed proper at
the time, in view of the facts as they then were or appeared to be,
the personal representative should be entitled to restitution.
When a distribution to actual or supposed heirs, legatees or bene-
ficiaries of a trust is at the expense of other heirs, legatees or bene-
ficiaries, the claim to restitution is generally recognized in the Ameri-
can cases when sought by those entitled to the assets. This is true
where the recipient was overpaid because of mistake or a deficiency
of assets. It is true also where the recipient was entitled to no share,
not being an heir, legatee or beneficiary, as was supposed at the
time of distribution. There is enough American authority granting
restitution where the mistake was one of law to justify the conclusion
that this is not a serious obstacle to recovery by the true beneficiary.
If the action is by the personal representative, restitution will be
awarded inder most of our decisions if the mistake was one of fact,
but if it was a mistake of law there is a sharp division of opinion.
Even though the mistake of law doctrine is accepted generally so as
101 MAss. GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 197, § 4 (1958).
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to deny restitution of money paid which was not owed, it should not
be applied to the action by the fiduciary. Nonetheless, account must
be taken of the fact that the doctrine has been applied in a significant
number of cases.
When a decedent's estate is insolvent and the personal represen-
tative mistakenly overpays a creditor, he is entitled to restitution of
the overpayment by nearly all American authority if the mistake was
one of fact, but with some uncertainty where the mistake was one of
law. There seems, however, to be less inclination to draw the law-fact
distinction in this situation than there is when restitution is sought
from an overpaid heir or legatee. If the fiduciary has not compensated
the underpaid creditors, they should be able to obtain restitution on
their own behalf.
In all of the situations in which restitution is generally awarded
to a fiduciary, this should be done without regard to whether the
fiduciary has or has not compensated the creditors or beneficiaries
who were entitled to the funds, and the cases as a whole support
this conclusion.
In this paper no attempt has been made to discuss one important
issue, that is, res judicata. It is a troublesome problem in connection
with distribution of a decedent's estate pursuant to order of the pro-
bate court. If such an order was entered after notices given as re-
quired by statute, it is clear that the personal representative is
protected in making distribution pursuant to the order, but the
effect of the order as a final adjudication of beneficial interests is a
separate question. Local statutes must be consulted, but under con-
ventional analysis one would expect a final decree of distribution to be
regarded as a final adjudication which will bar restitution from one
beneficiary in favor of another, 0 2 unless the order is either modified'
0 3
or subject to collateral attack. There are decisions to this effect, 0 4
102 The effect of a final decree of distribution is discussed in Simes, The
Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem, in MODEL
PROBATE CODE 489, 498 (1946). One of the troublesome problems that may
arise is whether a probate court has jurisdictions to construe a will, as may
be necessary in order to decree final distribution.
103 In Aull v. St. Louis Trust Co., 149 Mo. 1, 50 S.W. 289 (1899), distri-
bution was made pursuant to a court order which was later determined to be
erroneous and modified at the same term of court. In a separate action, a
group of heirs who had been overpaid was ordered to make restitution to
the heirs who had been underpaid.
'04 Dow v. Scully, 376 Mich. 84, 135 N.W.2d 360 (1965); Michie v. Grainger,
149 Mo. App. 301, 129 S.W. 983 (1910). In another Michigan case it was held
that judicial approval of a testamentary trustee's annual account showing dis-
tribution of assets to certain persons was no bar to the claim of the decedent's
widow to a share in the assets under the terms of the will. The question of
will construction was not involved in the approval of the account and "has
never been adjudicated." In re Wagar's Estate, 295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227.
(1940).
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but there are also decisions that grant restitution of a distribution
made pursuant to court order without discussing the effect of the
order,10 5 as well as decisions ordering restitution without disclosing
whether or not the distribution was pursuant to court order.100
105 Gray v. Goddard, 90 Conn. 561, 98 A. 126 (1916) (dictum); Roach v.
Underwood, 192 Tenn. 378, 241 S.W. 498 (1950). In Moritz v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 291 Mich. 190, 289 N.W. 126 (1943), the estate of an intestate had been
distributed, pursuant to order of the probate court, to the supposed heirs,
including three daughters and an adopted son of a deceased brother. The
adopted son was not in fact an heir under the Michigan law then in force.
Nearly a year later one of the daughters sought mandamus to compel the
lower court to grant leave to take an appeal, but the supreme court refused
to issue the mandate, partly on the ground that to readjust "the final distribu-
tion of the residue would entail ... great hardship on the administrator and
the surety on his bond who have long been discharged." But the court ex-
plicitly stated that its decision was "without prejudice to any rights petitioner
may have to bring an action at law or in equity... to recover moneys paid
through mistake of law" to the adopted son. In a subsequent action restitu-
tion was granted. Moritz v. Horsman, 305 Mich. 627, 9 N.W.2d 868 (1943).
106 Cuibreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64 (1849).
